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Med-Arb: An Alternative to Interest Arbitration
in the Resolution of Contract Negotiation Disputes
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act' was promulgated to encourage
stability in the field of industrial labor relations. To aid in accomplishing
this goal, the Supreme Court, in a series of cases collectively known
as the Steelworkers Trilogy,2 outlined a policy favoring settlement of
labor disputes with grievance procedures established through collective
bargaining agreements.3 The collective bargaining agreement has since
become the most powerful means through which management and labor
determine their rights and duties with respect to their employment
relationship.
The primary focus of the collective bargaining agreement is to es-
tablish a method by which disputes arising out of the employment
relationship are settled. "Grievance handling mechanisms have been
described as the heart of union-management contracts because their
effectiveness largely determines how well parties adhere to the labor
agreement."'4 Consequently, a variety of grievance procedures have been
developed as management and labor representatives strive to create
workable, effective solutions to the problem of dispute settlement in
labor relations.
There are five traditional methods of dispute resolution in the labor
law arena: negotiation,5 mediation, 6 arbitration,7 strike, 8 and. lockout. 9
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
2. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
3. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
4. J. MARTIN, T. KEAVENY & R. ALLEN, READINGS AND CASES IN LABOR RELATIONS
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 245 (1985).
5. "[C]ommunication for the purpose of persuasion." S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F.
SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 19 (1985) [hereinafter DISPUTE RESOLUTION].
6. "The act of a third person in intermediating between two contending parties with
a view to persuading them to adjust or settle their dispute." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
885 (5th ed. 1979).
7. "The reference of a dispute to an impartial (third) person chosen by the parties
to the dispute who agree in advance to abide by the arbitrator's award issued after a
hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard." Id. at 96.
8. "The act of quitting work by a body of workers for the purpose of coercing their
employer to accede to some demand they have made upon him and which he has refused."
Id. at 1275.
9. "Cessation of furnishing of work to employees or withholding work from them in
effort to get for employer more desirable terms." Id. at 848.
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However, the faults of each of these methods have led labor relations
experts to promote various alternatives to these procedures.' 0 Mediation-
arbitration (hereinafter: med-arb) is one such alternative. Med-arb is a
hybrid process of dispute resolution combining elements of both me-
diation and arbitration in an effort to maximize the positive effects of
both. Briefly, the parties to a dispute agree that the dispute will be
heard by a mediator having the authority to arbitrate any unresolved
issues." The med-arbiter thus has the power to determine a binding
settlement. This element alone increases the parties' incentive to deter-
mine their own agreement through mediation.
This Note will explore the feasibility of med-arb in the labor dispute
context. An initial description of traditional methods of dispute resolution
in the labor field, including a discussion of the pros and cons of each
method, is necessary to illustrate the flaws which med-arb seeks to cure.
Next, med-arb, as it has been used to date, will be discussed and
analyzed in the context of its effectiveness in the labor arena. Finally,
this Note will examine critics' questions of the feasibility and consti-
tutionality of med-arb. This Note concludes that despite these challenges,
med-arb is a highly effective and desireable method of resolving certain
types of labor disputes.
II. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
As noted, there are five traditional methods through which parties
to a labor dispute seek to resolve their differences. 12 While negotiation,
mediation, and arbitration are discussed independently below, strikes
and lockouts are discussed where appropriate in those sections.
A. Negotiation
Negotiation is the most widely used method of dispute resolution, 3
and is typically the first step taken in resolving labor disputes. Parties
generally find negotiation initially advantageous as it involves only the
disputing parties. No third party is brought in to coerce an agreement.
The parties are free to propose settlements and "exchange promises
[and make binding] commitments"' 4 to reach a mutually satisfactory
resolution. If the parties reach an agreement, the agreement is enforce-
10. See generally DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 245-309.
11. M. CARRELL & C. HEAVRIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS
149 (1985).
12. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
13. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 7.





able as a contract. The key to negotiation, however, is compromise, and
because labor relations has a built-in tension between management and
labor, the parties to a dispute may find it difficult to reach an adequate
settlement through negotiation.
Negotiations fail when the parties bargain to impasse. At this point,
strikes or lockouts are traditionally used as economic weapons to force
the other party to change its position. 15 The destructive force of these
weapons, however, leads parties to seek the assistance of a neutral third
party, familiar with the industry and knowledgeable in the settlement
of labor disputes.
B. Mediation
The least intrusive of third-party neutrals is the mediator. 16 The
mediator's primary function is to help the parties negotiate their own
settlement. While the mediator has no power to impose a binding
agreement, mediation has been found to assist in resolving disputes by,
"establishing a constructive ambience for negotiation . . . collecting
and judiciously communicating selected confidential material, . . . seek-
ing joint gains, . . .keeping negotiations going, . . . [and] articulating
the rationale for agreement."' 7 Furthermore, settlements reached through
mediation are typically well suited to meet the parties' needs because
the parties themselves have established the terms of the agreement. By
aitempting to guide the parties, the mediator, unlike a typical adjudi-
cator, is privy to any and all information which the parties wish to
disclose. Additionally, the mediator is free to confer privately with the
parties, and may use the information discovered through such a con-
ference to formulate a solution acceptable to both parties.
The strength of mediation, therefore, lies in its flexibility. For this
reason, it has been the most successful method of solving labor disputes.'8
Consequently, only after mediation has failed should other methods be
considered.
There are, however, several major disadvantages to mediation. First,
the mediator has no power to impose a binding agreement on the parties.
If a settlement is reached, it is enforceable only as a contract. While
a contract is binding, it does not have the force of a judicial decree.
Consequently, the parties may feel less compelled to adhere to the terms
of the agreement than they would were a judge or arbitrator to issue
a binding agreement. A second problem with mediation is that the
15. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
16. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 91.
17. Id. (quoting H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982)).
18. H. EDWARDS, R. CLARK & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 647 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter LABOR RELATIONS LAW].
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mediator has no power to prevent a strike should mediation fail. A
strike in any industry can have far-reaching, detrimental effects on an
entire community-effects which the mediation process is powerless to
prevent. Thus, while mediation is widely and successfully used in labor
relations, its effectiveness does not extend beyond its ability to create
an atmosphere amenable to successful negotiations between management
and labor.
C. Arbitration
Arbitration is a second method of dispute resolution falling under
the third-party intervention category. Arbitration, like mediation, is used
in resolving labor disputes after internal grievance procedures fail (namely,
negotiation). Unlike mediation, however, arbitration is an adjudicatory
process "in which disputants present proofs and arguments to a neutral
third party who has the power to hand down a binding decision, generally
based on objective standards."'19 Labor arbitration can be divided into
two distinct categories: grievance arbitration and interest or impasse
arbitration.20
Grievance arbitration, or arbitration of rights, involves an arbitrator's
interpretation of the parties' rights under an existing collective bargaining
agreement. To determine the parties' rights under the employment
contract, the arbitrator must determine the intent of the parties as it
existed when they entered into the contract.21 It is for this reason that
grievance arbitration tends to resemble the typical adjudicatory process.
The arbitration hearing is conducted much like a trial, and as such is
the most formal of the procedures available for settling labor disputes,
without resorting to formal litigation.
Impasse or interest arbitration is arbitration entered into upon the
failure of the parties to negotiate the terms of a new collective bargaining
agreement. It is, therefore, used as an alternative to the threat of strikes
and lockouts in determining the contract rights of the parties. 22 While
interest arbitration is also an adjudicatory process, negotiating is more
central to the peaceful resolution of an interest dispute than are the
procedural requirements of grievance arbitration. This is because interest
arbitration is the negotiating of the terms of the contract/collective
bargaining agreement and grievance arbitration is a process for deter-
mining the rights of the parties under a previously established contract.Y
19. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 149.
20. See LABOR RELATIONS LAW, supra note 18, at 633.
21. J. MARTIN, T. KEAVENY & R. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 247-48.
22. See LABOR RELATIONS LAW, supra note 18, at 633.
23. For purposes of this Note, interest arbitration will be the basis of comparison in




While arbitration is a somewhat formal method of dispute resolution,
it is not as rigid as traditional courtroom adjudication. Although rules
of procedure and evidence are germane, strict adherence to these rules
is not required unless the parties so stipulate in a pre-arbitration agree-
ment.24 Therefore, although arbitration is formal because the parties
submit evidence and arguments in a judicial-like proceeding, it is less
formal than traditional adjudication because the procedural rules and
substantive law may be set by the parties.2
The major advantage of arbitration over mediation is that an arbi-
trator's decision is binding on the parties and enforceable at law. The
decision, therefore, is subject to review only on limited grounds.26 Labor
arbitration has, however, been widely criticized as being slow, expensive,
and formalistic.27 The dual functions of arbitration-to avoid strikes and
to provide a satisfactory alternative to litigation 28-are, therefore, ov-
ershadowed by the realities at hand.
In sum, mediation and arbitration are effective, widely employed
methods of solving labor disputes through third party intervention. Their
respective disadvantages have, however, led commentators and practi-
tioners to promote and utilize new methods of resolving labor disputes.29
III. MED-ARB
Med-arb, as stated above, is a dispute resolution process in which
the parties agree that the dispute will be heard by a mediator with the
authority to arbitrate any unresolved issues.30 Med-arb was developed
in response to the demand that major labor disputes be resolved through
"compulsory arbitration," 3' rather than through the use of strikes and
lockouts as disruptive and expensive economic measures. Hence, med-
24. D. ROTHscILD, L. MERRIFIELD & H. EDWARDS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND
LABOR ARBITRATION 213 (2d ed. 1979).
25. DisPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 8.
26. The Steelworkers Trilogy cases established that interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement is a question for the arbitrator, not for the courts (United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)), and that judicial review
of arbitral awards should be reserved for cases where the arbitrator has exceeded his
powers. See generally Yedwab, The "'Essence" of the Labor Arbitration Process: A New
Focus, 39 ARB. J. 28 (Dec. 1984). The enforceability of a decision reached through
mediation is subject to the general principles of contract law and is thus open to attack
through such doctrines as fraud, or misunderstanding.
27. Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective Bargaining Contract:
An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. U.L. Rav. 270 (1982).
28. Id. at 272.
29. See generally DIsPuTE RESOLUTION, supra note 5.
30. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
31. Kagel & Kagel, Using Two New Arbitration Techniques, 95 MONTHLY LAB. REv.
11, 12 (Nov. 1972).
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arb focuses on negotiations entered into voluntarily by parties who have
forfeited their right to strike or lock-out.32 Furthermore, in agreeing to
participate in med-arb, the parties give up the right to ratify the final
settlement. According to the Kagel model,33 because med-arb is entered
into voluntarily by the parties,
it pays strict adherence to the axiom that the best agreement is an agreement
which the parties themselves reach . . . . The presence of the med-arbiter
provides the incentive to the parties to achieve their own agreement, since
they know that if they fail to do so, the med-arbiter will through his decision
[sic] make the agreement. 34
Med-arb thus cures some of the problems inherent in both mediation
and arbitration by combining the hospitable environment of mediation
with the finality of a binding agreement.
A. Advantages Over Mediation
As noted supra, the primary disadvantage of mediation is the me-
diator's lack of authority to create a final and binding settlement. During
mediation, the mediator may suggest a settlement proposal, but any
final agreement is the product of compromise between the parties. The
mediator helps each party evaluate its options against the proposals of
the other party, but the mediator has no "muscle" 35 in the role as a
third-party facilitator. The med-arbiter, however, has the power to ar-
bitrate any issues not successfully resolved through mediation. Ironically,
it is this fact-the med-arbiter's authority to arbitrate those issues which
cannot be mediated-that decreases the probability that any issues will
actually be decided by the med-arbiter in the role as an arbitrator. The
med-arbiter's presence, and the threat of an arbitrated decision create
tremendous incentive for the parties to successfully mediate their dis-
pute.36 Furthermore, because the parties agree in advance to accept any
arbitrated decisions as binding (as in traditional arbitration), med-arb
has been called "mediation with muscle. '3 7 The final product of med-
arb, whether resulting entirely from mediation, or both mediation and
arbitration, becomes the entire settlement which is binding, nonratifiable,
32. Id.
33. Sam Kagel, a San Francisco attorney/arbitrator, is credited as the first to develop
med-arb. He employed it initially to settle a 1970 San Francisco nurses' strike. See
generally Kagel, Combining Mediation and Arbitration, 96 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 62
(Sept. 1973).
34. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 265.
35. Kagel & Kagel, supra note 31, at 11.
36. Kagel, supra note 33, at 62.
37. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 265.
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and enforceable at law.38 Med-arb thus effectively eliminates a major
weakness of mediation.
A second disadvantage of mediation, which med-arb eliminates, is
the mediator's inability to prevent a strike upon the failure of mediation.
A critical prerequisite to a med-arb is an advance agreement under
which the parties agree to arbitrate any issues which cannot be suc-
cessfully mediated. Such advance agreements have been entered into
as late in the process as after a strike has already begun39 and as early
as before any dispute has been anticipated.40 This agreement, therefore,
gives the med-arbiter the power to determine a binding agreement and
forces the parties to forfeit the right to strike or lockout. If the strike
has already begun, the advance agreement forces the striking employees
to return to work before the med-arb can begin. 4' Under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA),42 employees have the right to engage in
concerted activity "for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. '43 Inherent in this provision is the right to
strike for greater benefits or improved working conditions.44 Furthermore,
the right of an employer to use a lockout to promote its bargaining
position is also protected by the Act. Hence, strikes and lockouts have
traditionally been the most effective albeit drastic means of promoting
each parties' bargaining position. It may be questioned whether the
forfeiture of these rights is desirable, particularly in light of the Act's
intent to give employees a statutory right to strike. However, the
inherently destructive nature of both the strike and the lockout must
be kept in mind. These tactics injure not only employees and their
employers, but often have a devasting effect on the community.45 It is
therefore to the benefit of both labor and management, when agreeing
to med-arb, to forfeit these rights and concentrate on the resolution of
the issues in dispute.
Med-arb is particularly well-suited to resolving contract-negotiation
disputes (where interest arbitration has traditionally been used) in the
38. See supra note 25.
39. See generally Kagel & Kagel, supra note 31, at 12 (med-arb used to settle 1970
San Francisco nurses' strike).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 13.
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
43. Id. at § 157.
44. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
45. This problem was evidenced by the 1986-87 COTA bus drivers strike in Columbus,
Ohio. The inability of citizens to use public transportation affected those citizens' ability
to work, and decreased the volume of business of local merchants. In any other city in
which the population relies more heavily on public transportation (e.g. New York City),
such a strike could virtually paralyze the city.
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public sector where strikes are often statutorily proscribed.4 The tra-
ditional justification for this prohibition is summed up in a statement
made by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1937: "A strike of public employees
manifests nothing less than an attempt . . . to prevent or obstruct the
operations of government until their demands are satisfied. Such actions
toward the paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support
it is [sic] unthinkable and intolerable." 47 Thus, under the NLRA, federal,
state, and local governments are not considered employers;48 government
employees are not considered employees; 49 and the rights and duties
granted by the NLRA do not apply to government employees. Conse-
quently, any and all rights which government employees submit for
collective bargaining are determined by federal, state, and local em-
ployment relations acts. These acts often include provisions forbidding
government employees to strike. Using med-arb to settle interest disputes
in the public sector would thus help to equalize the bargaining positions
of the parties, which are lost through provisions forbidding strikes.
An excellent example of med-arb's effectiveness in settling contract
negotiation disputes in the public sector is its role in settling a 1981
bargaining dispute between the Social Security Administration (SSA)
and the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE).50
Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,5 1 an impasse in contract
negotiations may, upon the request of either party, be referred to the
Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP) which may "take whatever action
is necessary" 52 to resolve the impasse. The SSA-AFGE impasse marked
the first instance in which the FSIP used med-arb to resolve a contract
dispute.
The successful resolution of this dispute through med-arb was the
result of several factors.53 First, federal employees did not have the
option to strike.5 4 They were, therefore, more open and accepting of
alternative forms of dispute resolution and were undoubtably looking
for the method which would give them the strongest voice. Second, the
med-arb was voluntarily adopted by both labor and management, al-
though initially it was requested by management and rejected by the
46. The following states give public employees a limited right to strike: Alaska, Hawaii,
Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
47. R. WOODWORTH & R. PETERSON, COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION FOR PUBLIC AND
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES 32 (1969).
48. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
49. Id. at § 152(3).
50. See generally Allred, Med-Arb and the Resolution of the SSA-AFGE Bargaining
Impasse: A Case Study, 39 ARB. J. 46 (June 1984).
51. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-8913 (1982).
52. Id. at § 7119(c)(5)(B).
53. See generally Allred, supra note 50, at 46.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7)(A) (1982).
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union. This criterion of voluntary acceptance is the cornerstone of any
successful med-arb, and cannot be overemphasized. A third factor was
the lack of formal ground rules. In this med-arb, the med-arbiter "made
it clear to both parties that he was going to call the shots as he felt
they should be called at the time the call was necessary."55
Fourth, "criteria to be applied in evaluating proposals, was quickly
established and understood by the parties.15 6 That criteria in this par-
ticular med-arb was "that managemant had to be able to control the
work force, while recognizing certain institutional rights of the union.
57
A fifth factor was the requirement that the parties view med-arb "as
an extention of negotiations with arbitration as a matter of last resort.1 58
Because the issues of this med-arb were resolved at the mediation stage,
clearly the parties feared future arbitration and were more willing to
compromise.
The success of the SSA-AFGE med-arb demonstrates that med-arb
can be a very effective alternative to the rdsolution of interest disputes
in the public sector. However, the presence of the controlling factors,
which made this med-arb a success, narrows the applicability of med-
arb.
B. Advantages Over Arbitration
Med-arb has also been found to effectively eliminate disadvantages
commonly associated with arbitration. As noted previously, arbitration
is typically criticized as being slow, 9 expensive,60 and formalistic. By
eliminating the judicial nature of arbitration, med-arb effectively reduces
costs and resolves grievances in one to seven days, depending on the
number of issues to be resolved.6 ' Procedurally, med-arb is much less
formal than arbitration. No records or transcripts are taken, and any
issues which the parties deem relevant are open for discussion and if
55. Allred, supra note 50, at 52.
56. Id.
57. Id., quoting Jerry Ross, the med-arbiter in this med-arb.
58. Id.
59. The cost of a one day arbitration hearing can be as high as $1000 per party.
Expenses associated with most arbitration hearings today include: The arbitrator's
daily fee, which normally varies between $150 and $225; the arbitrator's travel
time and study time, normally paid at the daily rate; the fees for the parties'
attorneys. . .; wage payments to plant personnel who take part in the proceedings;
rental of a hearing room; payment to the American Arbitration Association for
furnishing the parties a panel of arbitrators if the association is used; and steno-
graphic transcription costs, if a record of the hearing is desired.
Usery, Some Attempts to Reduce Arbitration Costs and Delays, 95 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
3 (Nov. 1972). Note that these figures are from 1972 and are likely to be higher today.
60. Id. The average time from grievance date to receipt of an arbitration award is
over 200 days.
61. Kagel, supra note 33, at 63.
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necessary, decision. 62 Typically, during med-arb negotiations, the parties'
are brought closer together through offers and counteroffers, so that if
an issue does proceed to arbitration, the differences between the positions
are often minimal.
Finally, under med-arb, the adversarial nature of arbitration is said
to be substantially decreased 63 and the hearings are more akin to
traditional negotiations. According to Sam Kagel,
[iln carrying out the functions of med-arb, you have in effect
negotiating meetings. We don't have records, we don't take a
transcript, and we take up each issue whatever it might
be . . . .Most interest problems are settled by direct negotiations
and since both parties approach the problem with complete honesty,
they come within the area of settlement. 64
Furthermore, because all issues resolved through mediation become part
of the final, binding agreement enforceable at law, the parties have a
tremendous incentive to keep their demands honest. The med-arbiter
may pull a party aside to examine its evidence ("which it has prepared
in the event they will go to arbitration") 6 and evaluate the correctness
of its position. If the med-arbiter finds that a party falsely represented
its position, the med-arbiter has the power to arbitrate the issue at
hand, and is likely to hold for the other party. Consequently, med-arb
"really does keep [the parties] honest. ' 66 The result of this honesty is
that, typically, during the med-arb negotiations, the parties' positions
are brought closer together. 67 This, in turn, allows the med-arbiter, in
the role as an arbitrator, to formulate a decision that is likely to
accomodate the needs of both parties.
C. Disadvantages
Med-arb is not a panacea for the resolution of all labor disputes. As
with any other method of dispute resolution, med-arb is effective only
in the presence of certain conditions. Various commentators have dis-
cussed the factors necessary for an effective med-arb,68 and there is
some consensus to those requirements.
62. Id. at 62.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Stern, The Mediation of Interest Disputes by Arbitrators Under the Wisconsin
Med-Arb Law for Local Government Employees, 39 ARB. J. 41, 45 (June 1984).
66. Kagel, supra note 33, at 62.
67. Id.
68. See generally Allred, supra note 50, (factors critical to effect med-arb: the no
strike option; voluntary adoption; ground rules; established criteria for discussions; med-
arb as an extension of bargaining; education of constituencies; and constraints on the
mediator). See also J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING
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Of key importance is voluntariness. If parties do not enter a med-
arb voluntarily, chances of a successful mediation of all issues are greatly
diminished. Thus, where med-arb is statutorily mandated, the results
have not been as promising. This situation is illustrated by Wisconsin's
Municipal Employment Relations Act,69 which specifically provided for
med-arb of municipal employee disputes involving teachers and "a wide
variety of blue and white-collar employees of cities and counties. '70
Under the Wisconsin law, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Com-
mission (WERC) had the authority to appoint a mediator-arbitrator
upon the failure of the parties to modify their final offers. Once the
mediator-arbitrator determined that mediation had failed, a choice be-
tween the two positions was necessary in making a final determination. 71
Therefore, under the Wisconsin law unless the parties agreed otherwise,
the mediator-arbitrator was not free to fashion a settlement, but had
to choose between the parties' final offers. In this context, the Wisconsin
provision mandating med-arb was different from the process used in
the Kagel model.
The Wisconsin system for solving interest disputes in the public sector
had varied success. Between 1978 and July 31, 1983, 703 cases were
settled through the use of med-arb. Of those, only about fifty percent
were resolved at the mediation stage. 72 The remainder went into final
offer arbitration. Some of the reasons for the failure of med-arb to
resolve issues at mediation are as follows: "one side was supremely
confident that it had a winner; [t]he issue involved something that [was]
regarded as a basic philosophical point [under which] one party would
prefer to lose rather than make the compromise; [and] bargainers [had]
no flexibility or authority to move." 73 However, it was also clear from
the statute that the requisite voluntariness, necessary for any successful
med-arb, was absent, thus contributing to failure in these instances.
Consequently, the Wisconsin med-arb statute was amended in 1985 to
provide for the settlement of such disputes through traditional interest
arbitration.
CONFLICTS WITHoUT LITIGATION 278 (1984) ("This med-arb approach may work best
when the participants are of relatively equal bargaining experience and the efficiency of
a combined procedure outweighs the inhibiting or strategic effect of the mediator's
anticipated role change"); Polland, Mediation-Arbitration: A Trade Union View, 96
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 63 (Sept. 1973) (med-arb "should be undertaken primarily in
situations where the issues truly are difficult or complex. . . [and] should be used where
an impasse in negotiations could result in a strike that would have a serious impact upon
the community or on the economy.").
69. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70, 111.71 (West 1978).
70. Stem, supra note 65, at 41.
71. In this respect, the Wisconsin model is more akin to final offer arbitration than
to the Kagel model.
72. Stem, supra note 65, at 43.
73. Id. at 43, 44.
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Other factors of key importance to a successful use of med-arb in
the resolution of labor interest disputes include the need for the med-
arbiter to have the authority to fashion a result which seems most
appropriate for the situation at hand. This element was also missing in
the Wisconsin system, for the med-arbiter could only choose between
the final offers of the two parties. Additionally, the parties must agree
beforehand to forgo the use of a strike or lockout should the mediation
fail. This element forces the parties to remain at the bargaining table
or risk having their dispute arbitrated by the med-arbiter.
Consequently, med-arb cannot be used to resolve every type of labor
dispute. While the Kagel model has been used in a variety of arenas
such as nursing, journalism, shipping, public utilities, saloons, teamsters,
and education,74 its greatest success has been in resolving interest disputes
(contract negotiation disputes) in fields where a strike is either statutorily
proscribed (as in the public sector), or where the parties cannot risk
the cost of a strike and are hence quite willing to try med-arb. In sum,
the greatest disadvantage of med-arb is its limited application.
IV. CRITICAL ISSUES
Using med-arb in both private and public sector labor disputes raises
two issues: first, whether the use of med-arb compromises the integrity
of the adjudicative role, and second, whether med-arb provisions in
governmental employment statutes are likely to withstand judicial scru-
tiny if challenged as violative of due process.
A. Integrity of the Adjudicative Role
Under med-arb, the med-arbiter plays a dual role. As mediator, the
med-arbiter may call private conferences with either party and may
view any and all evidence the parties are willing to produce. As arbitrator,
however, the med-arbiter must be a neutral adjudicator viewing only
that evidence which is determined to be admissible under the standards
established for that arbitration. Med-arb has thus been challenged as
compromising the adjudicative role because the roles of the mediator
and arbitrator cannot be successfully combined.75 In sum,
[m]ediation and arbitration have distinct purposes and hence distinct mor-
alities. The morality of mediation lies in optimum settlement . . . . The
morality of arbitration lies in a decision according to the law of the contract.
The procedures appropriate for mediation are those most likely to uncover
74. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 265.




that pattern of adjustment which will most nearly meet the interests of both
parties. The procedures appropriate for arbitration are those which most
securely guarantee each of the parties a meaningful chance to present
arguments and proofs for a decision in his favor. Thus, private consultations
with the parties, generally wholly improper on the part of an arbitrator, are
an indispensable tool of mediation.76
It has been argued that the med-arbiter cannot successfully block
out information learned through mediation when determining an award
as an arbitrator.7 7 Others argue that the parties will not freely divulge
information to the med-arbiter in the fear that such information will
be used against them if mediation fails.71 In response to these arguments
attacking med-arb as compromising the integrity of the adjudicative
role, one must keep in mind that med-arb, in the labor dispute arena,
is best reserved for the resolution of interest disputes only-that is,
reserved for those disputes in which the parties are attempting to
determine the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement. Nego-
tiation, not adjudication, is the cornerstone of med-arb when used as a
substitute for interest arbitration. There are no previously established
contract rights, and the third party is not called upon to determine the
rights of the parties under an existing collective bargaining agreement.
The med-arbiter's presence during contract negotiations keeps the parties
moving toward settlement. Consequently, the information the med-arbiter
learns from opposing parties during the negotiations typically helps to
bring the parties' views on a particular issue closer together, so that
any arbitrated decision is more likely to be mutually satisfactory to the
parties. Furthermore, judges are often called upon to rule on the ad-
missibility of evidence, and then must use only that admissible evidence
in determining a holding. It is presumed that judges are able to render
decisions based only upon such admissible evidence, and that they have
learned to block out extraneous, yet potentially prejudicial, matters.
Through proper training, there is no reason why med-arbiters could not
be afforded the same presumption. Arguments challenging med-arb as
compromising the adjudicative role are, therefore, defeated by an un-
derstanding of the true nature of med-arb.
B. Due Process Challenges
A second issue raised by med-arb is whether the parties to a statutorily
mandated med-arb are assured their constitutional rights to due process.
76. Id. at 248.
77. Id.
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Again, the answer to this challenge has its basis in the nature of med-
arb. Although a mandated med-arb lacks the voluntariness which can
be critical to success, the parties remain free to agree to restrictions
and rules insuring procedural fairness of the proceedings. The Wisconsin
med-arb statute was challenged in Milwaukee County v. Milwaukee
District Council,79 on equal protection and due process grounds as an
unconstitutional delegation of authority.80 The Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals determined that "the appointed arbitrator performs an adminis-
trative, . . . rather than a legislative function, . . . [and] merely carries
out a legislatively-outlined administrative function."'" Because of the
"strong presumption of constitutionality [of] all legislative acts,' 8 2 only
those challenges which are proved beyond a reasonable doubt work to
find a statute unconstitutional. In this case, the argument against the
statute was that it made no provision for meaningful judicial review.
In rejecting this claim, the court pointed to the specific procedural
safeguards in the Wisconsin Municipal Employment Relations Act and
held that Milwaukee County (plaintiff) had not proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that these safeguards were inadequate. Consequently, the
argument for the constitutionality of med-arb is synonymous with the
argument for the constitutionality of arbitration. Thus, in the only case
to date in which a med-arb statute has been challenged on constitutional
grounds, the statute withstood judicial scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION
Med-arb has been shown to be an effective method of resolving
particular types of labor disputes in both the private and public sector.
While this Note does not suggest that med-arb be employed to resolve
all types of labor grievances, med-arb does effectively combine the useful
elements of both mediation and arbitration to create a workable alter-
native to interest arbitration. Furthermore, its voluntary nature weakens
arguments claiming med-arb is a threat to fair adjudication of disputes,
thus creating potential for its use in the resolution of disputes outside
the labor arena. Finally, statutorily-mandated med-arb has withstood
constitutional challenges and it is likely to withstand similar scrutiny
in the future.
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